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INTRODUCTION

One popular response to the problem of increasing health care
costs has been the introduction of programs of managed care. Selfinsured employers and both private and governmental third-party
payors frequently establish managed care programs for the purpose of
monitoring the provision of health care services to covered individuals
and, more specifically, intervening in and forestalling the provision of
inefficient or unnecessary services. As these programs become more
common, and some of their shortcomings become apparent, there is a
growing recognition that the aggressive management of care might
sometimes result in the denial of medically indicated care to individuals whose health care coverage involves a managed care program.
While there are both regulatory and common law developments responding to this concern, to date there has been no attempt at comprehensive regulation of managed care programs. It is the thesis of
this Article that there are, however, a number of established legal
doctrines that could be, but by and large are not, used to ensure
effectively that managed care programs do not hamper an individual's
access to necessary health services. In particular, this Article will
explore the potential for regulating managed care programs by enforcement of the following doctrines: the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine; the requirement that only licensed persons practice medicine; the prohibition against engaging in fee splitting; and the laws regulating the business of insurance. It will also
explore the ways in which these doctrines can inform the development of new regulation of managed care plans.
*¢
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Until recently, plans offering access to pre-paid health care services were predominantly referred to and structured as health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"). As the name suggests, HMOs were
initially intended to focus on the "maintenance" of the health of their
individual subscribers.' Through the prevention of morbidity, coupled
with a system of incentives designed to reduce both consumer and
provider demand for health care services, organizers hoped that
HMOs could reduce the health care costs of their subscribers.2
These same plans are now more generically referred to as "managed care plans" ("MCPs"). Part of the reason for the change in
nomenclature is undoubtedly the emergence of a plethora of alternative mechanisms for the provision of prepaid services.3 The change
in terminology is also an explicit recognition that the industry's primary means for achieving cost savings is not the maintenance of
health through prevention, but, rather, the management of care.4
1. For example, the purposes of one early HMO, Sound Health Association, were
described in its Bylaws as follows:
The purpose of Sound Health Association is to promote the maintenance of optimal
personal health by making available to the residents of the community comprehensive personal health care services and resources aimed at preventing and curing
specific diseases, reducing debilitation and discomfort, and improving individual
health behavior, in a manner . . . which reduces the impact of cost as a barrier to
securing needed resources and services . . . . This Association shall place special
emphasis on preventative medicine and health education programs ....
Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158, 162 (1978).
2.

See generally H.E. FRECH III & PAUL B. GINSBURG, PUBLIC INSURANCE IN PRIVATE

MEDICAL MARKETs 47-60 (1978).
3. HMOs are probably the most well known of the MCPs. However, there are a
number of new entrants into the MCP market. Independent Practice Associations ("IPAs"),
Preferred Provider Organizations ("PPOs) and Exclusive Provider Organizations ("EPOs) are
just some examples of the mechanisms through which pre-paid health care services are now
offered. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (involving and
describing a PPO). Generally, members of these organizations receive services from a select
group of providers who have entered into a variety of discounting and other cost-saving
agreements (most notably, for purposes of this discussion, agreements relating to the management of care) with the payor. See Mark Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior:
Legal Barriers to Heath Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 437 n.18 (1988)
(providing an extensive list of some of these mechanisms).
while some indemnity plans use managed care programs, such plans are predominantly
a feature of pre-paid plans that provide a service, rather than reimbursement, as their primary
benefit; accordingly, this Article will focus on managed care in the context of the latter type
of plan, although much of the criticism and analysis is equally applicable to a traditional
indemnity plan.
4. Because MCPs typically provide services on a pre-paid basis, the amount of premum revenue that MCPs receive from subscribers will remain the same regardless of the
volume of health care services consumed by the subscribers. Accordingly, MCPs must subsidize any excess in expenses for health care services over premium revenue. Conversely,
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Throughout the industry, the predominant focus appears to be on
controlling the services that are provided, rather than on providing
preventative services.5
This focus is at odds with the idealized vision of the MCP as an
entity that will be compelled by the principles of economics, if not
ethics, to ration care in a way that will prevent the occurrence of
major (and expensive) morbidity. One commentator explained the
economic incentives as follows:
[B]ecause they must provide comprehensive care from an inelastic
pool of resources, HMOs are well motivated to scrutinize the effectiveness of every risk-reducing measure they might take. Moreover,
because their responsibility for care is comprehensive and because
their organization usually allows them to provide more integrated
services than most other providers, HMOs are well situated to compare each possible risk reduction with other uses of the available
resources and to choose the most productive course of action.6
An MCP could be expected to view "health maintenance" (rather
than service limitation) as the most productive course of action only
if the MCP favors long-term over short-term profitability and anticipates that today's enrollees will also be tomorrow's enrollees. In a
highly competitive market,7 where MCPs compete on price and routinely lose and acquire large groups of enrollees (as employers and
physicians shift from plan to plan),' goals are likely to be more
short-term. The MCP will focus on reducing current costs, rather than
on maximizing its enrollees' long-term health. 9 Even if an MCP believes that the maintenance of health will ultimately result in profit-

because subscribers are not entitled to a refund in the event that health care expenditures
prove to be less than premium revenue, MCPs will, all other things being equal, profit by
reducing utilization of health care services and, accordingly, the amount expended by the
MCP.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 6-14 and 30-39.
6. Randall Bovbjerg, The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care: HMOs and Customary Practice, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1375, 1376.
7. See Citizens League, Minn. HMO Rev. 1989, 3 (1990) (observing that the market
was so competitive in Minnesota in 1987 that two HMOs became insolvent and three HMOs
posted large losses).
8. See Barry D. Weiss & Janet H. Senf, Patient Satisfaction Survey Instrumentfor Use
In Health Maintenance Organizations, 28 MED. CARE 434, 439 (1990) (observing that one
study found 23% of the enrollees who left their MCP (-disenrolled-) did so because they
desired services from a physician who worked with another plan).
9. See FREcH & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 48; Clark C. Havighurst & James F.
Blumstein, Coping with Quality/Cost Trade-Offs in Medical Care: The Role of PSROs, 70
NW. U. L. REV. 6, 36 (1975).
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ability, the ability to realize the goal of preventing costly illness is
dependent upon the capacity of the MCP to identify those persons
who are at risk for particular illnesses and to develop appropriate and
efficacious responses. It is doubtful that most MCPs possess such a
sophisticated ability. The economic pressures on MCPs to maximize
short-term gain, coupled with the limitations on their capability to
avoid illness, seems likely to result in policies that favor minimizing
care, rather than preventing morbidity.
Even if the MCP is assumed both to have adopted the long-term
view and to have the capacity to respond effectively to the risk of
illness, the long-term maximization of the health of the enrollee population might not be in the economic best interests of the MCP. Whenever the cost of providing an additional unit of service to an enrollee
outweighs the anticipated cost of the services that are avoided by its
provision, the MCP has an economic incentive to withhold that unit
of service.'" For example, an MCP might be expected to withhold
an expensive test that identifies only a few treatable cases." While a
judgment based on this principle unquestionably serves the interests of
efficiency, an ethical analysis that is concerned with the welfare of
individuals requires a weighing of the costs and benefits to the
patient's condition of providing a particular service, rather than the
costs and benefits to the payor of providing the service.' 2
10.

FREC-t & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 48.
11. Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 1390.
Thus, there might be universal agreement that a certain test improves the accuracy
of diagnosis from ninety to ninety-five percent in some moderately serious and
generally treatable condition; a fee-for-service doctor would almost certainly perform such a test if it were readily available and covered by insurance, since no
obvious benefit for his patient or himself could be achieved by foregoing the potential insurance payment. On the other hand, an HMO might decide that its
subscribers' resources were better spent, for example, on upgrading the staff of its
emergency room than on the test.
Id. Compare Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 982-83 (Wash. 1974) (holding a physician
liable for negligence when he failed to administer a glaucoma test to a patient under forty,
despite the extremely low incidence of glaucoma in that population) with David M. Eddy et
al., The Value of Screening for Glaucoma With Tonometry, 28 SURVEY OF OPHTHALMoLOGY
194 (1983) (implying that the cost of performing the glaucoma test is not justified, as the
test will identify very few cases of glaucoma and since nothing can be done to alter significantly the outcome even in those cases where glaucoma is found to exist).
Similarly, in cases where the adverse result that could be avoided by the additional
unit of service is expected to be incurred at some point other than in the immediate future,
one might expect the MCP to discount to present value the cost of the care that might be
required in the future.
12. See, e.g., Barry R. Furrow, The Ethics of Cost-Containment: Bureaucratic Medicine
and the Doctor as Patient-Advocate, 3 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 187,
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These incentives for short-term cost containment might explain
why MCPs are increasingly concerned with the management of care,
and why the management of care focuses on controlling access to
services (which is the most direct and current way of avoiding costs).
This focus is evident in the contracts entered into between the MCPs
and the providers who perform services on behalf of the MCPs.
These agreements typically incorporate provisions requiring the provider to comply with the plan's pre-admission utilization review,
referral, and case management policies and protocols.13 While these
policies and protocols are designed to serve a variety of functions,
4
they all operate to restrict or control the services that are provided.1
One of the features that has distinguished MCPs from other
systems of health care delivery is the provision of financial and other
incentives for providers to utilize health care services efficiently.
Indeed, as the foregoing discussion illustrates, much of the traditional
support for MCPs stems largely from the belief that the financial
structure of MCPs, as distinct from fee-for-service medicine, will
rationalize the provision of medical care by eliminating financial
incentives to over-utilize health care services. One commentator explained that MCPs "do not have mixed motives in imposing utilizaThe key ... may be imposing incentives on physition control ....
Physicians who are good at control may obtain rewards,
cians ....
and those who are bad may be punished . . . .
Providers have responded to these incentives by, among other
things, attempting to reduce access to health care services.16 There is
no novelty in the observation that these incentives may operate in
opposition to the physician's obligation to put his or her patients'
interests first.17 There is an inevitable tension between the provider's
desire to contain costs and the patient's interest in receiving the best
available (and all necessary) care. This is not to say that the tension
must inevitably result in a conflict. There are situations in which
patients' best interests can be served efficiently.'" "The crucial ques198-200
13.
14.
15.

(1988).
See supra note 3.
See Infra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
John S. Hibbs, Equity Financing for HMOs; An Overview, I HEALTH ScAN 15

(1984).
16. See Bovbjerg, supra note 6, at 1376.
17. See, e.g., Alan L. Hillman, FinancialIncentives for Physicians in HMOs: Is There a
Conflict of Interest?, 317 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1743 (1987).

18. For example, where a costly diagnostic test has been replaced by a test that is both
as accurate and less expensive, or where a painful and expensive procedure would not
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tion is not whether financial incentives affect physicians' decisions,
but whether some financial incentives distort physicians' judgment ....
Do some HMO incentives influence doctors to conserve
medical resources to excess-to the point where some patients do not
receive the medical services they need?"' 9 The problem arises where
the incentives to contain costs are so strong that conflict seems inevitable.
Because professional ethics2 ° and the specter of malpractice
claims provide a strong incentive for physicians to provide necessary
medical services,2 if incentives to economize are kept in check,
physicians could be expected to make decisions which take into account, first and foremost, the particular patient's interests, rather than
the interests of the provider or payor. Preservation of the physician's
professional integrity and independence might be an effective way to
temper the MCP's drive to conserve costs, but there has been remarkably little regulation directed at achieving this balance.
The concern that a physician's judgment might be influenced by
economic incentives is most often voiced in the law in connection
with the fear that some financial arrangements might create incentives
for over-utilization of medical services.22 There is, however, a growing recognition that certain types of financial incentives might also
result in under-utilization. 2' The acknowledgment that efforts at cost
containment might have resulted in a sacrifice in the quality of health
care has resulted in a regulatory focus not only on cutting health care
costs through containing utilization, but also on assuring that quality

enhance the patient's condition.
19. Alan L. Hillman, Health Maintenance Organizations, Financial Incentives, and
Physicians' Judgments, 112 ANNALs INTERNAL MED. 891; see also Hall, supra note 3, at 444
n.44.
20. See Furrow, supra note 12, at 198-200.
21. This Article does not seek to address the related and much debated question of
whether the current system of malpractice' liability creates inappropriate incentives to overutilize services such as diagnostic tests. See generally Bovbjerg, supra note 6, and sources
cited therein (discussing the incentives created by current malpractice law).
22. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.S. § 1395nn (Supp. 1991) (barring Medicare or Medicaid referrals to laboratories in which the referrer has a financial interest); id. § 1320a-7b(b) (1988)
(barring the payment of remuneration for referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients).
23. See Id. § 1320a-7a(b) (1988) (prohibiting HMOs from offering incentives to
under-utilize services and barring hospitals from offering inducements to limit or reduce
services to Medicare or Medicaid programs). But cf. Pub. L. 99-509 § 9313(c)(2), 100 Stat.
1874, 2003 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320a-7a note (West 1991)); 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7a(a)(3) (1988) (imposing civil money penalties for giving false or misleading information that could influence a decision as to when to discharge a Medicare or Medicaid patient).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

7

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:73

care is provided.24
These attempts to ensure that cost containment is not realized at
the expense of quality care are commendable. However, there are
several long-standing bodies of law that could be utilized to achieve
the same result. These include the prohibition against the corporate
practice of medicine,' the requirement that only licensed persons
practice medicine, 26 the prohibition against engaging in fee splitting, 27 and laws regulating the business of insurance. 2' The failure
to apply these bodies of law to MCPs is a result of the historical
29
support and legislative encouragement enjoyed by MCPs. This support grows primarily out of the perception that MCPs are effective
vehicles for cost containment. As this Article will demonstrate, conduct that is fundamentally the same as that which is severely penalized in other contexts-the involvement of unlicensed persons in the
provision of medical services, agreements to pay for referrals, and the
assumption of significant risk by parties who are not licensed to engage in the business of insurance-is tolerated in the context of
MCPs. If the established legal principles noted above were applied to
MCPs, MCPs might be encouraged to operate in such a way as to
alter the balance of interests in favor of quality care. At the same
time, application of these principles should not preclude MCPs from
using incentives to contain costs.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF INCENTIVES FOR COST CONTAINMENT
In order to understand how these legal principles are offended, it
is first necessary to understand the methods used by MCPs to encourage cost containment. Perhaps the most common method of cost containment is the provision of financial incentives to the gate-keeper,
most often the primary care physician, to limit his or her patients'
access to health care services. The terms of a patient's coverage often

24. See supra note 23 and infra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
25. See Infra notes 45-82 and accompanying text.

26. See 1d.
27. See infra notes 120-37 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 138-75 and accompanying text.
29. An example of the preferential treatment afforded HMOs is the fact that the federal
HMO statute exempts HMOs from the operation of some state insurance laws. See, e.g., 42
U.S.C. § 300e-10(a)(1)(D) (1988). The HMO Act also requires that certain employers offer
the option of obtaining HMO coverage to their employees. Id. § 300e-9(a)(1). There is no
similar requirement imposed on employers with regard to insurance or other types of health
care coverage.
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require that the patient obtain a referral from her primary care physician in order to gain access to other health services, be they tests,
pharmaceuticals, in-patient care or specialty medical services. Even in
the absence of such a requirement, the primary care physician, as the
physician of first resort, and the physician from whom referrals for
additional treatment or evaluation are typically made, is in a unique
position to control access to care. If the primary care physician does
not recommend products or services (e.g., a consultation with a specialist), the patient will receive these services only if she pursues
them on her own; it seems likely that most patients would not.
The MCPs have developed a variety of mechanisms to persuade
contracting physicians to restrict access to health care services. One
of the most common mechanisms is the capitation system.3" Under
this system, a medical clinic is paid a pre-agreed amount every month
(the capitation payment) for each patient who has elected to use it as
his or her provider of primary care. The capitation payments do not
vary regardless of the value or cost of services that the patient requests.31 If the clinic has struck a poor bargain-for instance, if its
pool of assigned patients includes an inordinate number of bad risks
or if it manages utilization ineffectively-it will lose money in connection with the services that it has contracted to provide.
A portion of the capitation may be retained by the MCP to cover the cost of patient services provided by third parties. These services are often available only pursuant to the authorization or referral of
the primary care physician. If, at the end of a specified period (generally a year), the cost of those services is less than the amount retained, all, or a portion, of the retained funds may be paid to the
physician. Some plans go further and provide that if the costs are in
excess of the retained amount, the provider may be compelled to pay
part or all of the excess to the MCP. This type of arrangement makes
the financial consequences of authorizing services very clear to the
provider.
Typically, the physician stands to lose much more from authorizing outside services than he or she will lose from performing his or
her own services. This is due primarily to the high cost of in-patient
and specialty care relative to primary care. Other factors, such as the

30. A 1987 survey found that 46% of the responding HMOs utilized capitation as a
method of payment. Hillman, supra note 17, at 1745.
31. For a further discussion of some of the financial mechanisms used by MCPs, see
Hillman, supra note 17; see also FREcH & GINSBURG, supra note 2, at 47.
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ability to regulate in-house costs and the inability to contract effectively with specialty providers,32 might also affect the relative costs.
The physician can decide to run his or her own practice more efficiently, but the only sure-fire way that he or she can control costs
generated by third parties is to deny access. 33 Another common arrangement utilizes a combination of a discounted fee-for-service
schedule and a reserve. The provider is paid a fee for each service
that he or she provides. This fee represents a discount from the
provider's customary charges. A percentage of each fee is retained as
a reserve by the MCP, to be distributed to the provider only in the
event that the reserve is not needed by the MCP to pay for subscriber
services and other health plan costs. Distribution of the reserve is
often made contingent on the physician's per-patient costs comparing
favorably to the average per-patient cost for the physician's specialty. 34

MCPs might seek to control utilization by levying a financial
penalty against a provider whose practice deviates from the norm. For
example, the percentage of fees withheld might be more for "high"
utilizers than it is for "low" utilizers. Providers whose utilization
deviates from the norm significantly might even be excluded from
participation in the MCP.3 5 Exclusion might mean the loss of all, or

32. Some larger primary care groups do enter into contracts with specialists, pursuant to
which the specialists agree to provide services to MCP patients of the primary care group at
a reduced rate; many small groups, however, cannot generate sufficient referrals to convince a
specialty group to enter into a discounting relationship. This latter problem can be negated if
the MCP, rather than the individual primary care providers, is 'able to enter into agreements
with the specialty groups.
33. See Rev. Rul. 68-27, 1 C.B. 315 (explaining that a prepaid plan that involved the
provision of services through plan-owned facilities and plan-employed staff was not insurance
because
an insurance contract must involve the element of shifting or assuming the risk of
loss of the insured and must, therefore, be a contract under which the insurer is
liable for a loss suffered by its insured. With respect to the preventive phase of
the medical service contract . . . there is no hazard or peril insured against. With
respect to the sick or disabled phase of the contract, although an element of risk
exists, it is predominantly a normal business risk of an organization engaged in
furnishing medical services on a fixed price basis, rather than an insurance risk. As
a result of illness or disablement, the contracting organization generally does not
Incur any expense other titan that which it incurs in providing the medical services
through a salaried staff of physicians, nurses and technicians (emphasis added)).
But cf. 82-71 Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 144 (1982); see also infra note 148.
34. See generally Hall, supra note 3, at 483-87; see also Hillman, supra note 17.
35. This mechanism raises questions of unlawful discrimination. If the norm is calculated
without reference to the demographics of the physician's patient base, a physician with sicker
patients will be penalized, not because of utilization, but because of the make-up of his or

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/2

10

Sanders: Regulating Managed Care Plans Under Current Law: A Radical Revers
1991]

REGULA7NG MANAGED CARE PLANS

substantially all, of a physician's practice.
The MCP might also impose overt controls on a patient's access
to health care services. Physicians might be required to seek prior
authorization for certain referrals and in-patient services. The
physician's contract with the MCP might put the physician financially
at risk for the cost of services performed without the requisite consent, or might impose some other penalty on the physician, regardless
of whether the services are ultimately proven to be medically necessary. Similarly, the MCP might require compliance with its care protocols, which might dictate, for example, permissible length-of-stay
guidelines. 6 One typical contract requires that the physician "comply
with all ... protocols ... relating to the provision of the services... including protocols related to hospital admissions and
length-of-stays, referrals to physicians and other providers of health
care .... "137

The MCP might control access in a more direct fashion. One
program recently adopted by a large MCP requires that certain costly
tests and procedures be pre-approved by the MCP. 38 If a test or procedure is ordered by a physician, the MCP will contact the patient
directly to ask a number of questions regarding his or her symptoms.
On the basis of the data collected from the patient, along with data
solicited from the physician, the MCP determines whether or not the
care is medically indicated.39
MCPs undoubtedly have a legitimate interest in making determinations as to whether particular services and items are medically necessary and, therefore, covered under the MCP's contract with the

her patient base. If the result is that the physician either leaves or is forced from the program, the MCP may conveniently rid itself of some of the physician's high-risk patients. The
MCP may thereby achieve indirectly what it could not do directly, given the open enrollment
requirements imposed upon many MCPs.
36. See, e.g., Physicians Heath Plan of Minnesota, 1983 Physician Participation Agreement. A brochure advertising a conference organized by a large organization representing
managed care providers noted that "[tihe use of clinical practice guidelines has moved well
beyond that of a 'passive aid' to practioners. Today they am an integral part of clinical
quality management efforts." Group Health Association of America, From Paradigm to Practice: Quality Management in the Clinical Environment (conference brochure). This statement
illustrates the industry's acknowledgement of the impact that practice protocols am intended to
have on practice decisions. It also requires that we acknowledge that practice protocols might,
in many instances, be directed not only towards cost containment, but also towards enhancing
the quality of care received by MCP beneficiaries.
37. Physicians Health Plan of Minnesota, 1983 Physician Participation Agreement.
38. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Minnesota, Value Health Services Program.
39. Id.
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subscriber. However, the controls used by MCPs are directed more
often towards restricting access to care than towards denying payment
after the care has been provided. This is, at least in part, because
restriction of access is less likely to cause subscriber dissatisfaction
than is denial of payment. The subscriber can be expected to be only
vaguely aware, if at all, that care that his or her physician has suggested, or would have otherwise suggested, is being withheld, while
she is likely to be acutely aware if payment is being denied; the
provider w¢ould conventionally look to the subscriber for payment for
such services. It is politically expedient for the MCP to obscure the
gap between its perception of medical necessity and the physician's
perception of medical necessity.
II. INVOLVEMENT IN THE PRACTICE OF MEDICINE

There are two legal doctrines that have been used to preclude
non-physicians from practicing medicine: the prohibition against the
corporate practice of medicine;4" and the requirement that only licensed physicians engage in the practice of medicine.4' While these
doctrines have been widely criticized as operating primarily to exclude competitors of physicians,4 2 they undoubtedly serve some legitimate objectives. Foremost among these is the protection of the public
from the ministrations of unqualified people.43 The corporate practice
doctrine also seeks to protect the autonomy of the physician to exercise his independent professional judgment, thereby seeking to assure
patients the best that the physician can offer.'
A. Overview of the ProhibitionAgainst the Corporate
Practice of Medicine and State Licensing Statutes
Although the corporate practice doctrine and the licensing statutes are concerned with similar problems, they are implicated by
different conduct. The corporate practice doctrine holds that no
layperson may interfere with the physician-patient relationship through
a relationship that carries with it the possibility of control over, or

40. See infra notes 45-53 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 54-80 and accompanying text. For ease of reference, hereinafter all
non-physicians shall be referred to as "laypersons.42. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 3, at 510-11.
43. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
44. See Infra notes 56-79 and accompanying text.
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influence of, the physician by the layperson. 45 A non-physician may
not hire a physician to perform diagnostic tests on third parties because "the law intends . . .that the patient shall be the patient of the
licensed physician[,] not of a corporation or layman. The obligations
and duties of the physician demand no less. There is no place for a
middleman."4 6 A corporation engaged in the practice of medicine
may not allow non-professionals on its board of directors because:
[w]ithout licensed, professional doctors on Boards of Directors, who
and what criteria govern the selection of medical and paramedical
staff members? To whom does the doctor owe his first duty-the
patient or corporation? Who is to preserve the confidential nature of
the doctor-patient relationship? What is to prevent or who is to
control a private corporation from engaging in mass media advertising in the exaggerated fashion so familiar to every American? Who
is to dictate the medical and administrative procedures to be followed? Where do budget considerations end and patient care be47

gin?

There is certainly the potential that some practices of MCPs
could interfere with the professional autonomy of affiliated providers,
and claims of such interference have occasionally reached the courts.
For example, in Varol v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan,48
the plaintiffs asserted that a pre-approval plan impermissibly interfered
with the physician-patient relationship. The court reasoned that the
plan was permissible because of the protection afforded by the treating physician's autonomy, explaining that:
[w]hether or not the proposed treatment is approved, the physician
retains the right and indeed the ethical and legal obligation to provide appropriate treatment to the patient. Thus, there is no direct
interference with the physician-patient relationship nor in the treatment rendered .... Plaintiffs are saying in effect, "Since I am
[the
weak in my resolve to afford proper treatment ....
preauthorization requirement] would induce me to breach my ethical

45. See generally Hall, supra note 3, at 453-61.
46. Granger v. Adson, 250 N.W. 722, 723 (Minn. 1933). See generally J. Anthony
Manger & Linda J. Cowell, The Corporate Practice Doctrine: Is it Still Viable?, 6 HEALTH
SPAN 3 (1989) (explaining that many states have statutes that prohibit the practice of medicine through the corporate form, except where the corporation is organized as a professional

corporation).
47. Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 384 F. Supp. 434, 440 (W.D. Tex.
1974), on remand from 492 F.2d 131 (5th Cir.), aftid, 421 U.S. 995 (1975).
48. 708 F. Supp. 826 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
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and legal duties, and the Court must protect me from my own
weakness." 49

The court declined to offer such protection to the plaintiff-physicians. 50
The court did not explore the question of whether the physicians
did, in fact, retain autonomy. Because the contract between the physicians and the administrator of the plan required compliance "with the
managed care requirements and procedures" 51 of the plan, and because there were some minor adverse economic consequences of
non-compliance, 2 there was a question at least as to whether that
autonomy existed. By guarding against the possibility that physicians
and laypersons will enter into relationships that allow laypersons to
exercise control or influence over physicians,53 the corporate practice
doctrine seeks to remove possible impediments to the legal and ethical obligations cited by the court in Varol. A physician's contractual
duty to abide by the decisions, processes, or protocols of a managed
care program, or her participation in an arrangement whereby she is
offered financial incentives to limit access to health care services, at
best, raises legitimate concerns about her ability to think only of her
patient's interests and, at worst, means that she has agreed to allow a
third party to exercise control and direction over her professional
judgment.
The prohibition against the unlicensed practice of medicine simply prohibits a layperson from engaging in activities that constitute
the practice of medicine. A typical state law provides that a person is
practicing medicine if he "offers or undertakes to prevent or diagnose,
correct, or treat in any manner ...

any disease

. . .

of any per-

son."54 The danger against which these statutes are directed is obvious: patients should be protected from the harm that might follow
from reliance on ill-informed advice. A patient might be damaged by
his reliance on erroneous advice, either because he is incorrectly diagnosed or treated, or because he might fail to seek professional medi-

49. Id. at 833.
50. One wonders, however, if the court would have reached the same decision if the
plaintiffs had been consumers of health care services, rather than physicians.
51. Varol, 708 F. Supp. at 830.
52. Id. In the plan at issue in Varol, the physicians would receive from the payor 80%
of the fee for services for which they did not obtain pre-approval, and were free to bill the
patients for the remaining 20%. Id. at 833.
53. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
54. MINN. STAT. § 147.081, subd. 3 (1991).
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cal help if he believes that he is receiving adequate care from the
unlicensed healer.
Conduct that has been found to violate the licensing statutes
usually involves a direct offer by a layperson, styling herself as a
healer, to engage in one of the prohibited functions. 55 While MCPs
do not hold themselves out as qualified healers in the traditional
sense, they often assert, in the context of both utilization review 6
and pre-approval programs,5 7 the right and ability to determine
whether particular diagnoses, treatments, or tests are medically appropriate. 58 Some also promulgate protocols setting forth appropriate
lengths of stay, testing and other guidelines relating to the practice of
medicine. The cases endeavoring to impose tort liability on MCPs for
the consequences of erroneous determinations as to the need for medical care59 illustrate the fact that MCPs are intimately involved in
making medical care decisions. Increasingly, these activities involve
direct contact with the patient or with the patient's family. Because
this involvement carries with it the very real possibility of influencing
the treatment that a patient receives, the same concerns that are raised
with regard to unqualified healers are raised with regard to MCPs.
The damage is done so long as the advice or determination could be
expected directly and significantly to influence the course of treatment
of the patient.60
55. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shenk v. State Bd. of Examiners in the Basic Sciences, 250
N.W. 353 (Minn. 1933) (holding that a "naturopath" who, without a license to practice
medicine, resorted to "natural" remedies in order to treat another person was unlawfully
engaged in the practice of medicine); State v. Rolph, 167 N.W. 553 (Minn. 1918) (holding
that the acts of a person who holds himself out as a doctor in caring for another person by
examining, diagnosing, or suggesting treatment for the person, constitutes the practice of
medicine, even though he neither prescribes a drug nor administers treatment); Op. Minn.
Att'y Gen. 303c-2 (Mar. 10, 1975) (maintaining that acupuncture constitutes the practice of
medicine).
56. See, e.g., Sarchett v. Blue Shield of Cal., 729 P.2d 267 (Cal. 1987). The "medical
necessity" decision at issue in Sarchen was, in all but terminology, a retrospective utilization
review decision.
57. See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of So. Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 877 (Cal. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that a medical insurer that determined that a patient was not in need of
further mental health treatment could be held liable for the patient's suicide after discharge);
Wickline v. State, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that third-party
payors of health care services can be held accountable for medically inappropriate decisions
resulting from defects in their cost containment mechanisms).
58. For examples of the practical dynamics of this involvement, see infra notes 61-80
and accompanying discussion.
59. See, e.g., Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. 876; Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810.
60. For further discussion of this issue from a variety of perspectives see Furrow, supra
note 12; Manger & Cowell, supra note 46; Hall, supra note 3; see also Bush v. Dake, No.
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One physician described a situation in which an HMO tried to
interfere with his treatment of a patient:
I have received requests from non-physician HMO staff members
that newly admitted, acutely psychotic patients be transferred immediately to a hospital affiliated with a capitated specialty group.
When I delayed the transfer to consult with the patient and family,
the HMO contacted family members directly and instructed them to
cooperate with the transfer, without mentioning the IMO's appeals
procedure. 6'
Similarly, one of the pre-approval62 programs of which I am aware
involves non-physician MCP staff contacting patients for whom certain procedures have been prescribed and gathering data relating to
the patient's symptoms. The63 MCP's decision is communicated directly
to the patient by the MCP.
The result of a pre-approval decision that a particular procedure
is not medically indicated is likely to be that the patient does not
receive the care. At least one court has recognized the significance of
the prospective review process, noting that "[a]n erroneous decision
[by an MCP] in a prospective review process . . . in practical consequences, results in the withholding of necessary care, potentially leading to a patient's permanent disability or death."'
There are several reasons why the care might not be received:

86-2576-NM, Mich. Cir. Ct., Saginaw Cty., April 27, 1989. According to Paul Craig, Health
Maintenance Organization Garekeeping Policies: Potential Liability for Deferring Access to
Emergency Medical Services, 23 J. HEALTH & HOSP. L. 135, 143 (1990), the Bush case was
scheduled for trial in early 1990, and involved allegations that certain financial incentives to
contain care offered by an MCP (the physician received a capitation payment) influenced the
plaintiff's physician both to refrain from ordering a pap smear and to refer the plaintiff to a
specialist. As a result of these omissions, the plaintiff alleged, her cancer was not diagnosed
in a timely fashion. The plaintiff alleged also that the MCP had failed to obtain her consent
to the incentive relationship. Cf Pulvers v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 160 Cal. Rptr. 392
(Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
61. See Douglas F. Levinson, Toward Full Disclosure of Referral Restrictions and
Financial Incentives by Prepaid Health Plans, 317 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1729, 1731 (1987).
62. Utilization review programs may require MCP approval during one of three phases
of treatment: before ("pre-admission review"); during ("concurrent review"); or after ("retrospective review") the treatment is contemplated. For a discussion of the evolution of these
programs see Danny Ermann, Hospital Utilization Review: Past Experience, Future Directions,
13 J.HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 683 (1988).
63. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of Minnesota, Health Value Science Program.
64. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 812. Along the same lines, one commentator has reported that there have been instances in which patients requiring immediate emergency attention
have been directed by HMOs to proceed to emergency rooms at HMO-affiliated hospitals,
even though other hospitals were closer to the patient. Craig, supra note 60, at 139.
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(1) the patient might accept the decision and decline to seek the care
in reliance upon the MCP's determination that the care is unnecessary; (2) the treating physician might choose to abide by the decision
because he allows contractual obligations or financial incentives to
sway his medical judgment; (3) the patient or the treating physician
might disagree with the decision but abide by it because of the perceived futility (or time-consuming nature) of an appeal, or might
simply be unaware that an appeal is available; or (4) the patient's
treating physician might treat the determination as a valid and convincing second opinion.
The possibility that the patient might act in reliance on the
MCP's judgment implicates the concerns that underlie the licensing
statutes. Such reliance seems especially likely where the decision is
conveyed directly to the patient by MCP staff, who might justify their
position by explaining why the physician's judgment is in error.
Pre-approval programs that involve the gathering of symptoms from a
patient and communication of a diagnosis to the patient involve many
of the features of the practice of medicine. In gathering data and
reaching a conclusion as to the correct diagnosis, the MCP acts as a
diagnostician. In issuing a statement as to the preferable therapy for a
particular diagnosis, the MCP is engaging in treatment of the patient.
To the extent that this information is gathered from and communicated directly to the patient, there might even be a physician-patient
relationship between the MCP and the patient. 65 When MCPs engage
in behavior that constitutes the practice of medicine, they are in violation of the physician licensing statutes.6
The MCP's decision might result in the denial of needed care
because of the impact that the decision has on the treating physician's
judgment. Two California cases-Wickline v. State67 and Wilson v.
Blue Cross of So. CaL.68-that involved MCP patients illustrate the
potential that a physician's judgment could be influenced by the mere
existence of a pre-approval requirement. Wickline involved the allega-

65. For a discussion of the elements of a physician-patient relationship, see Clarke v.
Hoek, 219 Cal. Rptr. 845, 850 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
66. Similarly, enforcement of protocols relating to the length of stay, diagnostic testing
and other subjects that are normally the province of the diagnostician might involve conduct
that falls within the statutory definition of the practice of medicine. See, e.g., John D. Blum,
An Analysis of Legal Liability in Health Care Utilization Review and Case Management, 26
Hous. L. REv. 191, 224-25 (1989).
67. 239 Cal. Rptr. 810 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
68. 271 Cal. Rptr. 876 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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tion that a patient had been prematurely released from a hospital as a
result of an MCP's determination that no further hospitalization was
justified, and had consequently suffered complications. The court
found that the treating physician believed that he was compelled to
follow the MCP's directions regarding the appropriate length of
stay.69 As a technical matter, the physician could have appealed the
initial determination, and he could have simply refrained from discharging the patient. Believing the first course of action to be a fruitless endeavor, and apparently believing the second to be impractical
(perhaps because he allowed the MCP's decision to sway his judgment as to the necessity of additional hospitalization), he chose instead to discharge the patient. It is notable in this case that the
MCP's decision was made by a physician who served as a consultant
to the MCP, and who disregarded the unanimous recommendation of
the patient's attending physicians without either reviewing the
patient's chart or examining the patient.7"
Wilson involved the allegation that a patient's suicide would not
have occurred if he had not been prematurely discharged from the
hospital.7 The patient's treating physician had recommended that the
patient remain hospitalized for three to four weeks. 2 The utilization
review firm (acting as an agent of the MCP)73 determined that inpatient treatment was not medically necessary.74 The patient's treating physician discharged the patient and told his parents that the
company had "terminated his [the decedent's] stay." 75 The physician
did not appeal the decision-in fact, it appears that no formal appeal
procedure was available-and shortly after discharge, the patient committed suicide.76 The treating physician later testified that there was
a "'reasonabl[e] medical probability' that the decedent would have
been alive if his hospital stay had not been prematurely terminat77
ed.
Wilson and Wickline are testimony to the fact that an MCP's

69. WicklIne, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 813.
70. Id.
71. Wilson, 271 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
72. Id.at 882.
73. Actually, the plaintiff was insured under a traditional indemnity type plan, which did
not require pre-approval of in-patient care. It was alleged that the plan erroneously submitted
the hospitalization request for review. Id. at 880-81.
74. Id. at 882.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 878.
77. Id. at 882.
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decision is likely to influence the care offered to a patient, even in
the absence of a relationship between the MCP and the physician. In
neither case does it appear that the physician had incurred any contractual obligation to the MCP that might have influenced him to
comply with the MCP's decision. Where a contractual relationship
exists that either explicitly obligates the physician to comply with the
MCP's decision" or creates financial incentives for the physician to
alter her practice patterns,79 the potential for cooption is greater.
Those features of the relationship between providers and MCPs that
give the MCP the ability to influence the care rendered to a patient
offend the corporate practice doctrine. The existence of such a relationship is particularly troubling in a context where the physician's
ability to exercise her independent judgment is crucial as a
counter-weight to the determination of the MCP.
Regardless of the physician's recommendation, the MCP's decision to deny coverage might result in the patient's decision to forego
the recommended medical procedure because the patient will now be
responsible for out-of-pocket expenditures.8" In this situation, we are
concerned only with the possibility that the MCP will make an erroneous decision. If, notwithstanding the licensing statutes, we assume
that MCPs may make these determinations in some contexts, the best
protection against that possibility is to protect the autonomy of the
patient's treating physician, so that she will act as the patient's advocate in any appeal of an erroneous decision. If the treating physician's
autonomy is compromised by the existence of a relationship that
carries-with it the possibility of control or influence, she is less likely
to act as an advocate for the patient.
There is clearly a need to develop a principled analysis for determining what cost containment practices are acceptable under the licensing statutes and the corporate practice doctrine. With regard to
the licensing statutes, one approach might be to focus on whether the
MCP has created a situation that makes it likely that the patient will
rely on, or the care will be determined by, the "advice" of the MCP.
Where the program involves direct communication with a patient, and
a decision is communicated as though it constituted a second opinion,
78. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
79. See id.
80. In one case involving pre-admission review, a patient was persuaded to cancel what
appears to have been medically necessary surgery after a claims adjuster implied, apparently
without any legitimate basis, that the surgeon's opinion was questionable. Ronald J. Fadel,
After the Carrier Scared My Patient Off, I Got Even, MED. ECON., Oct. 15, 1990, at 52.
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such reliance seems likely. Similarly, where the communication is
with the patient's physician, and the physician is bound by, or provided with an incentive to comply with, the decision, the decision
seems likely to dictate the care.
The analysis might also take into account the existence of mitigating factors. For example, if the MCP has a policy that requires
that only appropriately qualified personnel make pre-approval decisions, and requires further that such decisions be made on the basis
of a comprehensive review of the record, there is less likelihood of
an erroneous decision. This seems especially true if the courts allow
an MCP to be held responsible for erroneous decisions, even where
the treating physician had the last clear chance to avoid the adverse
outcome."1 Similarly, where the treating physician is in a position to
exercise his or her independent judgment-and likely to act as a
patient advocate-the situation is less problematic.
Relationships that offend the corporate practice doctrine are particularly troublesome in a context in which the party in a position to
exercise "control or influence" aggressively seeks to influence the
physician's judgment. Physicians should not be permitted to enter into
relationships with MCPs where they agree to abide by the MCP's
patient care decision, or where they are provided with significant
incentives to curtail utilization.82 The autonomy of the physician's
judgment is crucial to the preservation of a system of health care
delivery that purports to provide all medically indicated care.
The principles sought to be protected by both the licensing statutes and corporate practice doctrines-the quality of medical care and
fiduciary nature of the physician-patient relationship-are compelling.
The fact that MCPs continually apply pressure to the physician-patient
relationship gives the doctrines particular relevance.
B. Possible Legal Grounds for an Exception
from the Application of the Doctrines
1. Physician Involvement in Medical Decision-Making
When engaging in conduct that involves medical
decision-making, many MCPs utilize physicians in an advisory capacity. (For purposes of clarity, these physicians shall hereinafter be referred to as "MCP consultants.") It could be argued that the involve81. See, e.g., supra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. The parameters of acceptable incentives are discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 127-36 and 153-56.
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ment of a physician in the process leads to the conclusion that MCP
medical decision-making does not amount to the unlicensed practice
of medicine. This reasoning was seemingly endorsed by the United
States Supreme Court when it considered the question of whether the
policy of a professional association of dentists to withhold dental
x-rays from insurance companies violated the Sherman Act.8 3 The
dentists argued, among other things, that the evaluation of x-rays by
lay employees of the insurance companies constituted the unauthorized practice of dentistry." The Court rejected the argument as inapposite to the issue at hand, but noted in dictum that the
association's concern was not compelling. The review system compelled lay evaluators to submit any recommendation that benefits
should be denied, or that a less expensive course of treatment should
be pursued, to a licensed dentist serving as a consultant to the payors.
This fact led the Court to conclude that the practice was inoffensive.85 The Court noted that the consulting dentist made his decisions based on his professional judgment
that the materials available to him-x-rays, claim forms and whatever further diagnostic aids he chooses to consult-are sufficient to
indicate that the treating dentist's recommendation is not necessary
to the health of the patient. There is little basis for concluding that,
where ... a divergence of professional judgment exists, the treatment recommendation made by the patient's dentist should be assumed to be the one that in fact represents the best interests of the
patient. 6
In essence, the Court appeared to concede that the insurance companies were engaged in the practice of dentistry, and to conclude that
because the practice was conducted through a licensed dentist, the
concerns of the association were baseless.
The Court did not see fit to explore several questions that ought
to be raised with regard to the proposition that the patient's interests
are protected by the involvement of a professional in the review
process. First, many MCPs provide for comprehensive evaluation by a
consulting physician only if the provider appeals the MCP's initial
care decision.8 7 As a practical matter, the fact that the appeals pro-

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 465 (1986).
Id.
Id. at 464.
Id. at 464 n.4.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.0172(5)(b) (West 1991), which regulates the provision of
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cess is often cumbersome and time-consuming might preclude the
MCP consultant from involvement in many cases. Similarly, the physician might simply be unaware that the patient has a right to an
appeal. The provider might often accept the MCP's decision without
dispute (as did the physician in Wickline);88 the case might never
reach the MCP consultant for review.
Even if the MCP consultant can truly be said to be making the
decision with regard to a particular patient, so that she is practicing
medicine," it is unlikely that she is exercising the appropriate standard of care. It seems unlikely that the diagnosis and treatment of a
patient without a physical examination would normally meet the applicable standard of care, especially in contexts in which a physician
who had examined the patient had recommended a contrary course of
action.' ° This is precisely what happened in Wickline, where the
MCP physician made the decision regarding discharge without reviewing the chart and without seeing the patient. 9' If the MCP can be
said to be legitimately practicing medicine through its consultants, it
will often be committing malpractice.
The Wickline court held, however, that the MCP consultant's
erroneous decision to discharge the patient was not malpractice because the patient's physician, not the MCP, ultimately discharged the
patient. 92 The court opined that it was the physician's obligation to
appeal the decision if it was erroneous, and that, accordingly, the
fault was not with the MCP in making an erroneous decision, but
with the physician in failing to oppose that decision.93 This approach

utilization review services by private (i.e., third-party) utilization review agents, is illustrative
of this process in that it provides that initial review of the medical necessity of hospital
services may be performed by either a licensed practical nurse, a licensed registered nurse,
"or other similarly qualified medical records or health care professionals," but that a denial
determination may be made only by a licensed physician.
88. Wickline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 815.
89. See supra note 66.
90. See Indiana Fed'n of Dentists v. FrC, 745 F.2d 1125, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1984)
(noting with approval a professional association's policy that "a determination of [a] patient's
condition . . . be made [only with] the benefit of a complete examination which takes into
account all diagnostic aids, with a complete patient history and all clinical findings." (quoting
Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57, 119 (1983)); see also Craig, supra note 60, at 140
(explaining that "several studies have found that medical advice given over the telephone is
frequently so nonstandardized and substandard that the advice jeopardizes those calling for the
advice.").
91. Wlckline, 239 Cal. Rptr. at 814-15.
92. Id. at 819.
93. Id.
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has merit only if the patient's physician is free, both in theory and in
practice, to exercise his independent professional judgment.' If he is
compelled by the MCP to follow the MCP's decision, the MCP is
dictating the decision, and the physician may properly be said to be
an agent of the MCP. Accordingly, the MCP should not be able to
escape responsibility.
Furthermore, if the consulting physician is practicing, he or she
does so as an agent of the MCP and, accordingly, the corporate practice doctrine is implicated.95 The consulting physician could serve as
a medical advisor to the MCP without offending this doctrine, but as
soon as he or she undertakes to make medical care decisions for a
particular patient in a context in which the decision is intended to
dictate the care that the patient will receive, he or she is clearly practicing medicine and should be allowed to do so only within the constraints of the law.
2. The Nonprofit Exception
There is often one important exception to the prohibition against
corporate practice: nonprofit corporations may engage in the practice
of medicine. 96 As many MCPs are organized as nonprofit corporations, this exception deserves attention. The authorities setting forth
the exception contend that, in some contexts, the elimination of the
profit motive negates the concern that the corporation will interfere
with the delivery of medical care.97 These authorities also stress the
fact that those nonprofits that are permitted to engage in the practice
of medicine are committed to refraining from interfering with the
physician-patient relationship. Organization as a nonprofit corporation

94. Indeed, the Wicidine court contemplated that the payor could be held responsible for
adverse outcomes resulting from the payor's utilization review decisions where "medically
inappropriate decisions result from defects in . . . cost containment mechanisms . . . ." Id.
95. See Sloan v. Metro Health Council, 516 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987)
(noting that if the court were to find that a staff model HMO was precluded from practicing
medicine by the corporate practice doctrine, it would also have to find the operation of the
HMO to be illegal).
It has been suggested that a consulting physician could be viewed as acting solely as
an advisor to the plan, and not to the patient, and that, therefore, no physician-patient
relationship would exist between the consulting physician and the patient. Craig, supra note
60, at 139 (citing Blum, supra note 66, at 219.). This characterization ignores the fact that
the patient's care is likely to be influenced by the consultant's decision. See generally Craig,
supra note 60, at 139-40.
96. See generally Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U.
PA. L. REV. 497, 538-42 (1981).
97. 26 Op. Minn. Att'y Gen. 80 (1955).
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does not in and of itself confer immunity from application of the
doctrine. The exception applies only to those entities that are not
motivated by a desire to profit from the provision of medical services
and that do not interfere with the provision of medical services.9"
Many would argue that those MCPs that are organized as
nonprofits should be allowed to take advantage of the nonprofit exception. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is clear that many of those
nonprofits are operated, for all practical purposes, with the same
profit motive as that of a for-profit corporation. Nonprofit MCPs are
often operated by for-profit management companies." Indeed, many
nonprofit MCPs are created by the entities that control the management company."° The compensation of the management company is
typically related to the profitability of the MCP. The management
company exercises a great deal of control over the day-to-day operations of the MCP and, most importantly, serves as the liaison between
the physicians and the MCP. The ability of a management company
to assert control over physicians was recognized by New Jersey's
Commissioner of Health in the context of a relationship between an
outside management company and a group of physicians' offices. She
explained that because "the management firm can exert [influence]
over the entire fabric of the operation, there is the definite possibility
that the firm can affect the physicians' medical judgment."'0 ' The
MCP might be staffed entirely with management company employees
and serve as little more than a mail drop. In short, the MCP is typically dominated by the management company.

98. Id.
99. See, e.g., Hibbs, supra note 15.
100. For example, the two most recent additions to the Minnesota HMO market were
created at the same time as their respective management companies. Citizens League, Minn.
HMO Rev. 1989, 12 (1990). Because of the benefit reaped by the management companies,
these arrangements call into question the legitimacy of any tax exemption that a nonprofit
MCP might have. See generally Sound Health Ass'n v. Commissioner, 71 T.C. 158 (1978);
Rev. Rul. 69-54, 2 C.B. 117 (1969). Some nonprofit HMOs are converting to for-profit

status. Howard S. Levy, Note, Ronald J. Thompson v. Midwest Foundation Independent
Physicians' Association (ChoiceCare): The Conversion of Nonprofit Health Maintenance
Organizations to For-Profit Status, 16 N. KY. L. REv. 361 (1988). This perhaps reflects an
acknowledgment of the true character of the HMO. As of 1988, two-thirds of the nation's
HMOs were organized as for-profit plans. Id. at 361 (citing Meldin & Perkins, HMO Conversions: How to Distribute the Charitable Assets?, N.T*L HEALTH L. PROGRAM, Oct. 1987, at
467).
101. Womens Medical Center v. Finely, 469 A.2d 65, 71 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1983); see also Flynn Bros., Inc. v. First Medical Ass'ns, 715 S.W.2d 782, 785 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986).
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To be sure, the nonprofit MCPs have boards of directors with
members who may be, at least in part, persons who do not have an
economic interest in the operation of the MCP. However, it is the
management company that is making the day-to-day operational decisions and, because one of the dominant goals of the MCP is cost
containment, it is unlikely that the board will be motivated to exert
significant pressure to the contrary. In any event, the MCPs cannot be
said to be refraining from involvement in medical decision-making,
and this is a crucial distinction between MCPs and the nonprofits that
have been allowed to take advantage of the nonprofit exception.
3. HMO Statutes
Various state HMO statutes acknowledge, either directly or indirectly, that HMOs will be involved in the provision of medical services.'" Consequently, it might also be argued that MCPs organized
as HMOs are not subject to the corporate practice doctrine.' 3 It is
unlikely that the domination of HMOs by for-profit management
companies is contemplated by these statutes. Furthermore, these statutes do not specifically authorize HMO involvement in medical
decision-making. So, while it might be possible to conclude that the
HMO statutes protect the relationship between the professional medical care provider, acting as such (as either an employee or an independent contractor), and the HMO from scrutiny under the corporate
practice doctrine, it is difficult to conclude that actual lay involvement
in medical decision-making will be protected if it amounts to either a
significant intrusion into the treating physician's medical judgment or
the unlicensed practice of medicine.
C. A Possible Solution: Transferring Responsibility for Medical
Decision-Making to an Independent Third Party
It seems likely that MCP involvement in medical decisions will
increase. There is a real need to develop principles that can be applied to each instance of possible involvement in order to distinguish
legitimate from illegal practices. There are numerous activities direct-

102.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 27-21A-23(a) (1986).

103. For a discussion of the federal HMO statute's effect on state corporate practice
prohibitions as applied to federally qualified HMOs (42 U.S.C. § 300e-10(a)), see Philip C.
Kissan & Ronald M. Johnson, Health Maintenance Organizations and Federal Law: Toward
a Theory of Limited Reforinmongering, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1163, 1218 (1976); see also
Jeffrey F. Chase-Lubitz, Note, The CorporatePractice of Medicine Doctrine: An Anachronism
in the Modern Health Care Industry, 40 VAND. L. REV. 445, 480-82 (1987).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

25

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:73

ed at cost containment that do not implicate either the corporate practice doctrine or the state licensing laws, and it is undoubtedly desirable to allow for the development of mechanisms whereby utilization
can be contained appropriately and efficiencies encouraged.
The problem is that it is very difficult to identify the point at
which legitimate behavior becomes illegitimate. MCPs might legitimately make coverage decisions that involve a determination of
whether particular benefits are covered under their contracts with
enrollees. MCPs are responsible only for payments for which they
have contractually obligated themselves, and enrollees have an interest
in knowing what services will be paid for, prior to incurring an obligation to pay for the services. But as soon as the coverage decision
involves inquiry into whether a particular procedure is medically
necessary, the possibility of involvement in medical decision-making
arises. If the pre-approval process involves communication with and
control over a treating physician, the corporate practice doctrine might
be violated. If the process involves direct contact with a patient, the
licensing statutes might be violated. MCPs may legitimately educate
affiliated providers on the efficient practice of medicine. MCPs have
a legitimate interest in containing costs, and the elimination of unnecessary care serves the enrollee's interest, both in cost containment and
the avoidance of unnecessary tests and treatment. However, as soon
as the MCP attempts to compel a provider to follow its treatment
protocols, the MCP begins to undermine the physician-patient relationship and to jeopardize the independent exercise of the physician's
medical judgment.
One approach would be to resolve the tension between cost
containment and patients' rights by adopting a bright line rule barring
MCPs from prospective coverage decisions to the extent that they
involve determinations of medical necessity, and by further precluding
MCPs from issuing statements relating in any way to standards of
medical practice. In order to promote efficiency, MCPs could be
permitted to affiliate with truly independent advisory organizations,
which would take over these functions. These organizations would be
responsible for studying utilization and recommending policies and
protocols for avoiding over-utilization and promoting health. If these
organizations were staffed by physicians, and if they were truly independent from the MCPs, they might better approximate the idealized
notion of the MCP as an entity that has both the capacity and the
incentive to prevent illness. One could expect professionalism to
motivate these groups to develop appropriate, novel, and effective
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methods of containing costs. In order to avoid any possible conflict
of interest, it would be preferable for these groups to be paid in a
manner that bears no relationship to the performance of the MCP.
A network of organizations that perform utilization review on
behalf of third parties already exists."'O These organizations offer
their services to private sector clients, such as self-insured plans
maintained by employers, and to the public sector in connection with
the Medicare program.0" In order for these organizations to avoid
the problems with utilization review and the use of protocols, detailed
above, the regulatory approach to utilization review will have to
change significantly. Until recently, the activities of these reviewers
have gone largely unregulated, at least to the extent that they have
served the private sector. However, states are beginning to adopt laws
regulating the activities of these private utilization review firms."°
These laws are concerned primarily with confidentiality, 0 7 responsiveness and accountability, 0 8 and the involvement of qualified personnel in coverage decisions."
While these first attempts at regulation are laudable,"0 the statutes are deficient to the extent that they do not address the form in
which the organization may be structured, the qualifications or rela-

104. While many MCPs manage care themselves, many contract with independent third
parties to perform utilization review on their behalf. See, e.g., Wilson v. Blue Cross of So.
Cal., 271 Cal. Rptr. 876, 833 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). As a result, a substantial private industry
has developed to assist MCPs in managing care.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 1320(c) (1988).
106. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-9-901 (Michie 1991); FLA. STAT. §§ 395.0172,
395.037 (West 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.530-311.599, 311.990 (Michie/BobbsMerrill 1988) (to be codified in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. Ch. 211 and subtitles 17, 18, 32 and
38 of Ch. 304); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 2342-45, tit. 24-A, §§ 2771-74, tit. 22, §
1829 (West 1990); MD. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1301 to -1313 (1991); Mississippi Senate Bill
2393 (effective July 1, 1990) S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-70-10 to 38-70-60 (Law. Co-op. 1990);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5300 to -5309 (Michie 1990). See generally Richard A. Hinden &
Marguerite A. Snyder, State-Level Utilization Review War: Who Reviews the Reviewers?, 4
BENEFrS LJ. 345 (1991).
107. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. § 19-1311 (1990).
108. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2342(3), tit. 24-A, § 2771(3) (West
1990).
109. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0172(2)(c)8 (1991) (requiring, among other things, that a
negative coverage determination must include the written evaluation and findings of a reviewing physician); MD. CODE ANN. § 19-1307(a) (1991) (requiring physician involvement in
coverage decisions, but only in cases involving chemical dependency or mental health services).
110. It should be noted that the States* ability to regulate utilization review activities of
self-insured plans may be constrained by the preemption provisions of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §
1144(a) (1988).
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tionship to the payor of those who control the organization, the scope
of permissible activity, or the possibility that the reviewing organization might render its decision in a context in which the treating physician is obligated or encouraged to accept the decision without protest."' They are also deficient in at least one other major respect:
by and large, they completely fail to address the possibility that the
physician, nurse, or other person performing the review might have a
conflict of interest by virtue of either his relationship with his employer or the MCP's relationship with the reviewer's employer. The
few statutes that acknowledge that the reviewer's judgment might be
impeded by a conflict of interest do little to obviate the problem." 2
A better regulatory scheme could be modeled after the system
used to regulate Peer Review Organizations ("PROs"). PROs are
organizations used by the federal government to perform utilization
review and quality assurance activities on behalf of the Medicare
program. 3 The primary function of PROs is to protect against
over-utilization of Medicare and Medicaid services. 1 4 PROs are
nonprofit, physician-dominated organizations that are independent of
the control of the providers whom they review.' 5 PROs routinely
engage in pre- and post-procedure medical necessity decisions; they
review services to establish whether the services are medically necessary, whether the quality of the services is sufficient, and whether inpatient services could have been provided more economically on an
out-patient basis.1 6 The PROs establish norms of care, diagnosis,
and treatment, including designations of the most economical type of
health care facility considered medically appropriate for the particular
diagnosis. 1 7 PROs operate pursuant to a complex statutory scheme

111. For an interesting discussion of what types of protocols carry with them a degree of
coercion, see Hall, supra note 3, at 454-60.
112. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 395.0172(5) (1991) (requiring disclosure of payment arrangements providing an incentive to deny services); MD. CODE ANN. § 19-1305.1(a) (1990)
(precluding a physician who is involved in the review of chemical dependency or mental
health services from being compensated in a manner that rewards a denial or reduction of
coverage).
Because of the deficiencies in the statutes noted above, they cannot properly be read
as condoning any particular activity engaged in by the utilization review firm. The corporate
practice doctrine and licensing statutes can be read to apply to the utilization review process
without conflicting with these regulatory schemes.
113. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c (1988 & Supp. 1 1989).
114. S. REp. No. 92-1230, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 254 (1972).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 1320c-3(b) (1988).
116. Id. § 1320c-5.
117. Id. § 1320c-3(a) (1988 & Supp. 1989).
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designed8 to ensure that neither over-utilization nor under-utilization
11
occurs.
One could envision the current network of PROs expanding to
serve the MCP industry. Indeed, many PROs already perform some
review services for private organizations,"1 9 and there are numerous
private utilization review organizations that perform utilization review,
primarily for employer-sponsored self-insurance plans. Concentration
of utilization control functions on PROs could be expected to give
PROs access to significant epidemiological data. PROs are likely to
have the sophistication to use that data. Moreover, so long as their
compensation was not linked to the performance of the MCPs on
whose behalf they provide advice, PROs could be expected to take
the long view. With PROs, or other similar organizations, taking over
utilization control, MCPs might be more effective in their efforts to
cut costs through prevention.
In summary, in order to address the concerns discussed thus far,
regulation of utilization review should embody, at a minimum, the
following requirements:
1.

In order to insulate the utilization review decisionmaker from financial and institutional incentives to
deny needed care, prospective utilization review
decisions (and perhaps all utilization review decisions, since all are directed towards influencing,
and probably do influence, practice patterns)
should be made by third parties who are not controlled by, or otherwise related to, the MCP, and
whose compensation is not contingent on the performance of the MCP.

2.

In order to encourage professionalism, to ensure
that decisions are made by qualified personnel, and
to curtail lay involvement in the practice of medicine, the independent utilization review organization should be controlled and directed by physicians.

118. Id. § 1320c.
119. Ermann, supra note 62, at 689 (citing data from a 1983 survey conducted by the
American Peer Review Association, which found that eighty-nine of one hundred eleven responding PROs were conducting utilization review for private payors).
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3.

In order to minimize erroneous decisions, and in
recognition of the significant impact that denial
decisions can have on the care received by patients, denial decisions should be made only by a
physician, after the review of such information that
would normally be required by a physician rendering a second opinion in consultation with a primary care physician.

4.

In order to encourage the treating physician to
appeal denials that she feels to be inappropriate,
appeal procedures should be standardized, rationalized and publicized.

5.

In order to encourage MCPs to engage in programs of prevention, the organization should be
required to collect specified data and to participate
in a program of epidemiological study on the
efficacy of various modalities of diagnosis.

6.

In order to protect the patient from misplaced
reliance, and in recognition that the MCP is not
assuming the role of the treating physician (because of its inherent conflict of interest, and because it is unlikely to be exercising the standard
of care that is required of a treating physician), the
MCP should be required to gather diagnostic information from the treating physician (if the accuracy
of the information is at issue, a second opinion
could be required) rather than from the patient,
and should be required to communicate any diagnostic information through the treating physician.

[Vol. 20:73

While these proposals are radically at odds with the current practice
of the industry, with the exception of the proposal outlined at point
five, all of them are firmly grounded in the doctrine and policy that
produced the prohibition against the corporate practice of medicine
and the requirement that only licensed physicians practice medicine.
III. FEE-SPLITTING
Restrictions on referrals vary from plan to plan. A provider is
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often required to make all referrals to participating providers unless
certain limited conditions exist and unless the provider complies with
designated procedures. The latter restriction is often so onerous that it
effectively precludes out-of-system referrals. While the patient might
be aware that comprehensive coverage is available from the MCP
only if she uses participating providers, she is unlikely to know that
her physician's freedom to refer to other providers is restricted. 20 If
the physician abides by the restrictions, the patient might not be
given the option of electing to receive care outside of the plan.
A. The Referral Relationship
Restrictions limiting referrals to participating providers serve at
least two purposes. The most obvious purpose is cost containment.
Participating providers have typically agreed to provide services at a
discount from their customary fee schedule. A second significant
purpose is that the restrictions give the MCP something to offer-increased volume-as an inducement to referral providers to
become participating providers. A specialist or hospital enters into a
provider agreement and gives a discount in return for inclusion in the
network of providers to whom referrals may be made.
The referral relationship is also valuable to the primary care
physician. Where MCPs put the primary care physician at risk for the
cost of health care services, the discount offered by the specialist
inures directly to the primary physician's benefit, as it serves to reduce the cost of the referral services. Even if the primary care physician is not at risk, there are incentives to refer patients to participating providers. MCPs often make it a condition of participation in the
MCP that the physician conform her referral patterns to the MCP's
requirements. The physician might have access to the MCP's patients
only if she agrees to the restrictions on referrals.
B. Legal and Ethical ProhibitionsAgainst Payments for Referrals
There are both legal and ethical prohibitions against a physician
offering something of value in exchange for a referral. At the state
level, these types of arrangements are generally referred to as fee-

120. The failure to disclose adequately the existence of referral restrictions might amount
to a deceptive trade practice under state law. Cf. Richard M. Alderman, The Business of
Medicine-Health Care Providers, Physicians and the Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 26
HOUs. L. REV. 109, 128 (1989) (discussing how the failure to disclose information required
for informed consent might be a false, misleading, or deceptive practice).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

31

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 2
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:73

splitting. For example, a typical anti-fee-splitting law provides that
"paying [or] .. .receiving . . a . . .rebate, or remuneration, directly or indirectly, primarily for the referral of patients . . . , [constitutes] grounds for disciplinary action . ..""
*. Federal law makes it
a felony to give or receive anything of value in exchange for a referral of a Medicare or Medicaid patient."n A physician who owns an
interest in a home health agency may not certify the necessity of that
care to Medicare,' 3 and recent legislation extends this principle to
prohibit a physician from referring to clinical laboratories in which he
has a financial interest."2 4 The medical profession's ethical standards
also counsel physicians to avoid financial relationships that might
influence their medical judgment."
These prohibitions against fee-splitting are concerned primarily
with the possibility that a physician who stands to gain financially
126
from the use of health services will over-utilize these services.
The underlying assumption is that financial incentives will interfere
with the physician's medical judgment, and that she might consequently use services that are not medically indicated. There is also a
concern about quality, inasmuch as financial incentives might sway a
provider to choose services that are less than optimal. The use of
financial incentives to contain costs should lead to an equal concern
that physicians might under-utilize services. That a physician might be
inclined to withhold medically indicated treatment, or to refer a patient to a provider who is the physician's second choice, seems at
least as problematic from the patient's point of view as the possibility
that financial incentives will lead the physician to over-treat the patient. Incentives to over-utilize and incentives to under-utilize deserve
at least equal attention.
C. Do Incentives to Contain Utilization Violate
ProhibitionsAgainst Payments for Referrals?
When a specialist agrees to give an MCP a discount from her

121.

MINN. STAT. § 147.091, subd. 1,

(1)

(1990).

122. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (Supp. 1991).
123. Social Security Act §§ 1814(a), 1835(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1395n(a)(2) (1988).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn (Supp. 1991).
125. See, e.g., American College of Physicians Ad Hoe Committee on Medical Ethics,
Standard Regarding Comnmercialization of Medicine and Other Conjicts of Interest, in ETHICS
MANUAL (1990).
126. See, e.g., Introduction of the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act of 1989, 135 CoNG.
REC. 241 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1989) (statement of Rep. Stark).
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regular fee schedule, she has clearly given the MCP something of
value. As has been discussed, 27 the quid pro quo for the discount
is the opportunity for the specialist to have MCP patients referred to
her. A specialist who gives a discount in exchange for the right to
see patients can thus be viewed as giving remuneration in order to
induce referrals. If the discount were given directly to a primary care
physician, and if the primary care physician were able to bill either
the patient or a third party for the specialist's services at a price that
is greater than the price at which she purchased the service, the discount would have the same economic effect as a cash payment inthe
amount of such overage made to the primary care physician by the
specialist.12 This practice would clearly run afoul of the prohibitions against fee-splitting, and both the primary care physician as the
recipient and the specialist as the inducer would be subject to scrutiny.129 Where the primary care physician is at risk for the cost of
the referral care, she likewise stands to benefit financially from the
reduction of any fees for referral care 30 and, thus, it is difficult to
see why the fact that the discount is given in the context of an MCP
provider agreement context should distinguish the exchange from
impermissible fee-splitting. The potential for distortion of the primary
care physician's judgment remains the same.
Even if the primary care physician is not directly at risk, and
.does not otherwise stand to benefit directly from the discount, the
arrangement is suspect. The primary care physician has agreed to
make the referrals in exchange for something of value: the opportunity to participate in the MCP. So long as the specialist agrees to give

127. See supra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
128. If the discount is passed directly through to the physician's patient, however, the
primary care physician would not profit by the discount, and his or her judgment would not
be expected to be influenced. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(A) (1988 & Supp. 1989),
which contains an exception for such discounts.
129. The Office of the Inspector General ("OIG"), HHS, recently promulgated regulations
setting forth "safe harbors." See 42 C.F.R. 1001-1001.109, pursuant to the Medicare and
Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Law, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b), which contain a limited safe
harbor for personal service contracts. In the preamble to the new regulations, the OIG explained the limited scope of the safe harbor as reflecting the concern that the Fraud and
Abuse Law might be implicated by arrangements between health care providers where the
payment might vary with the volume of referrals. 54 Fed. Reg. 3088 (1991). But cf. 42
C.F.RIL Part 1001 (54 Fed. Reg. 3088, preamble, at 50), in which the OIG indicates that it is
.expecting to publish a rule that will protect many of these [discounting relationships from
scrutiny under the Medicare and Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Law] . . . where certain standards are met . . . ." Just what these standards will be remains to be seen.
130. See supra page 103.
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a discount in exchange for an opportunity to participate, she is paying
for referrals.
D. A Potential Solution: Point of Purchase
Disclosure of Coverage Restrictions
Patients do benefit from the existence of these discounting relationships to the extent that the discount operates to reduce premiums
for MCP coverage. If the discount is applied to lessen the primary
care physician's risk, rather than passed on to the consumer, the
benefit is tenuous. Where the physician is not at risk, and if patients
make an informed decision to restrict their choice of provider to
participating providers, the prohibition against fee splitting should not
be implicated. In that context, the discount can be viewed as an inducement to the patient to choose a participating provider, and the
patient is, in fact, directing the physician to choose from the restricted
group. In such a situation, the interests of the patient and the physician are not in conflict: it is the patient's direction, and not the prospect of receiving something of value, that ultimately determines the
physician's judgment. If adequate disclosure were made, the MCPs
could continue to arrange with a network of providers to offer discounts without offending this doctrine.'31
It is unlikely that MCPs will voluntarily provide adequate disclosure. Full and effective disclosure is likely to create political problems
for the MCPs as enrollees realize that their options are being limited
in ways that are unacceptable. Accordingly, the disclosure might
properly be the subject of legislation. Legislation requiring disclosure
of certain subscriber rights is already a feature of insurance and HMO
statutes, 132 but the disclosure required by the statutes might not be
adequate either as to the scope or the method
of disclosure, and some
33
forms of MCPs are not regulated at all.1
A typical statute will require the MCP, for instance an HMO, to
disclose the fact that there are limitations on coverage." 3 These
statutes do not compel disclosure of the fact that participating provid-

131. See Levinson, supra note 61.
132. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62D.07(3)(b) (1990).
133. For example, an MCP may be organized as a preferred provider organization, with
the MCP acting as, a broker between the employer-purchasers of care and the

physician-providers of care. Because the MCP does not take risk or offer health services, it
may escape regulation under the insurance, health service plan, and health maintenance
organization statutes. The regulation of PPOs, as such, is in its infancy.
134. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62D.09(l)(b) (1990).
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ers have agreed to refer only to other participating providers. At a
minimum, the patient should be put on notice that her physician is
not necessarily selecting his first choice of provider, since a non-participating provider might be the physician's first choice. The patient
must be sufficiently informed so that she may elect to use a non-participating provider, and either forego
coverage or compel the MCP to
35
cover the out-of-network referral.1
Since it is unlikely that most subscribers read and understand
their policy documents, merely requiring that the restrictions be detailed in the policy document probably will not result in better informed patients. The most effective method of disclosure would be to
require the physician to inform the patient at the time that the referral
is made. The physician should be required to disclose the restriction
on referrals and indicate whether, absent these restrictions, she would
refer elsewhere. As a corollary to the disclosure requirements, the
physician's contractual obligation to the MCP should be restated to
require only that she always provide an option of a referral to a
participating provider. Under these circumstances, physicians who are
not directly at risk are likely to be forthright, thereby arming the
patient with the knowledge that he needs in order to make an informed choice; however, depending on the ability of the MCP to
exclude the physician from participation, and the degree of reliance
that the physician has on the MCP as a source of patients, there
might still be compelling financial incentives to satisfy the MCP.
Physicians who are directly at risk, however, seem less likely to
make effective disclosure. As discussed at length below, the financial
risk-sharing arrangement creates a high potential that the physician's
judgment will be distorted.'36 This writer feels that the risk of distortion is so high that point of purchase disclosure is unlikely to

135. This scheme is consistent with state fee-splitting laws that permit fee-splitting in
certain circumstances so long as the arrangement is adequately disclosed to the patient. See,
e.g., MINN. STAT. § 147.091, subd. 1, (4) (1990) (requiring that the physician disclose the
existence of the relationship and the fact that the patient is free to choose another health care
provider). Ethical canons also require disclosure of financial relationships that carry with them
the possibility of influencing a physician's judgment. See, e.g., Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the AMA, Current Opinions § 8.13 (1989) (requiring that the physician
disclose the existence of the restriction on referrals when "the patient's condition requires" a
referral to a non-participating provider). The report goes on to require that "[i]f a third party
limits a patient's access to necessary medical services . . . the physician should so inform
the patient and protest the limitation." Id.
136. See infra notes 138-75 and accompanying text.
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satisfy the goals of the anti-fee splitting legislation.' 37
IV. UNLICENSED INSURER

MCPs generally undertake to provide subscribers with unlimited
access to certain specified services in exchange for a pre-agreed payment. This arrangement is indistinguishable from traditional insurance
relationships, except that MCPs covenant to provide services, whereas
traditional health insurers typically contract to pay or reimburse costs
incurred as a result of the receipt of those same services. The result
is the same-both types of relationships shift the risk for the cost of
services from the patient to the payor.
Traditional insurers typically pass off some or all of this risk
onto reinsurers. MCPs may also purchase reinsurance. For example,
many HMOs purchase "stop-loss" insurance on in-patient hospital
costs. MCPs may also enter into relationships with providers pursuant
to which they pass off some portion of the risk to the providers.
These relationships serve the dual purposes of minimizing the MCP's
exposure and, by putting the physician at risk for all or part of the
cost of providing health care services to MCP patients, creating an
incentive for physicians to contain costs.
Risk-shifting arrangements might involve one or more of a variof
mechanisms. For example, some of these arrangements put the
ety
provider at risk for the cost of her own services. 3 ' This serves primarily to shift the risk for the provision of primary care services
from the MCP to the physician. Since the most significant cost of
providing services to patients is the provider's overhead, and since the
provider is unlikely to be able to control access to his or her own
services effectively (except, perhaps, by delegating tasks to ancillary
personnel), this mechanism is unlikely to result in a significant curtailment of access to medical care.
Another risk-shifting mechanism is to return reserves withheld by
the MCP only if the costs incurred in providing all covered services
to the providers' patients are kept below a particular level. 39 Since
this mechanism gives the provider a positive incentive to contain
costs, it might be expected to result in some degree of restraint on
the patient's access to care. If the return is based on plan-wide per-

137. See id.
138. For further discussion of these issues, see infra notes 142-53 and accompanying text.
139. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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formance, the incentive for individual providers to constrain access
could be expected to be minimal. Even if the return is based on
individual performance, the fact that the return is contingent and not
a sum certain dilutes its motivational strength.
Yet another mechanism is to put the provider directly at risk for
some of the cost of the provision of care to the provider's patients.' 40 Of all the methods of providing an incentive to contain
costs, putting a physician directly at risk seems most likely to persuade the physician to favor cost containment over the provision of
appropriate medical care. I am aware of several instances where this
type of a risk-shifting arrangement resulted in a three- to seven-physician primary care provider incurring an annual liability to an MCP of
between $30,000 and $70,000. The cost to the provider of authorizing
referral or in-patient care is direct, certain and current, whereas the
financial benefit to the provider of providing appropriate preventative
and corrective care is far more likely to be indirect, uncertain and
41
remote.

A. The Provider as Insurer
When the provider agrees to reimburse the MCP for certain costs
incurred in the provision of services to MCP patients, the provider's
role is indistinguishable from that of an insurer. The provider not
only agrees to provide services, but in essence she also agrees to
indemnify the MCP against the risk that the cost of care will exceed
the amounts reserved to pay for the care. A typical statutory defimition of insurance provides that insurance is "[a]ny agreement whereby
one party, for a consideration, undertakes to indemnify another to a
specified amount against loss or damage from specified causes, or to
do some act of value to the assured in case of such loss or dam, 142
age.

The general rule is that no one may engage in the business of
insurance without complying with a complex regulatory scheme and
obtaining a license.' 43

140. See supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
141. Even though the provider will typically be entitled to participate in savings that
might result from efficient utilization, the factors discussed supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text operate to make the provider more concerned with short-term profitability than with
long-term performance.
142. MINN. STAT. § 60A.02, subd. 3 (1990).
143. Id. § 60A.07, subd. 4 (providing that -[n]o insurance company or association . . .
not specifically exempted therefrom by law, shall transact the business of insurance in this
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The Supreme Court has determined that, for federal tax purposes,
a contract of insurance exists when there is an element of
risk-shifting or risk-distribution."4 Similarly, 'for purposes of an exception from the antitrust laws, the business of insurance is a practice
that: (1) has the effect of transferring or spreading a policyholder's
risk; (2) is an integral part of the policy relationship; and (3) is engaged in only by entities in the insurance business. 4 ' In holding
that a provider that had contracted to provide eye examinations and
necessary eyewear to union members in exchange for a capitation
payment was engaged in the business of insurance, an Illinois court
explained that
l]ike the insurance ...arrangement it attempts to distinguish, [the
plaintiff's] operation is essentially of a risk bearing nature: actuarial
data is used to calculate estimated use of services and [the plaintiff]
sets its rates accordingly; once payment is made by an employer
[the plaintiff] bears the burden of providing these services as needed, even if actual use is in excess of what was anticipated ....
[T]he essential element in those plans ... covered by the [Illinois
law] is the shift of risk of loss from one to the other ....
The rate of capitation paid to primary care clinics is calculated
using actuarial data. Once the clinic has entered into the capitation
relationship, it bears the burden of providing the services even if
actual use is in excess of what was anticipated. The MCP has thus
shifted the risk of loss to the provider.'4 7 In fact, a recent Maryland
Attorney General's Opinion concluded that providers who were at risk
for the provision of their own services (pursuant to a capitation arrangement), and for the services of others (pursuant to an agreement
to indemnify the payor against certain costs incurred for the provision

state unless it shall hold a license therefor from the Commissioner.").
144. See Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941).
145. Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 220-21 (1979)
(setting forth the test contained in the McCarren-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015
(1988), which act reserves to the states the regulation of the business of insurance).
146. National Consol. Indus., Ltd. v. Department of Ins., 392 N.E.2d 295, 298-99 (Ill.
App. 1979); see also OraCare DPO, Inc. v. Merin, 10 E.B.C. 2391, 2392 (D.N.J. 1989).
147. In a letter dated May 15, 1987 to the Physicians Health Plan (-PHP"), a Minnesota
HMO, the Minnesota Commissioner of Commerce took the position that, while PHP was free
to enter into an agreement with a hospital whereby the hospital assumed financial risk for its
services to PHP subscribers, it could not enter into an agreement whereby the hospital
assumed financial risk for services rendered to PHP subscribers by third parties over which it
has no control. For hospitals to assume the risk for services delivered by third parties would
render the hospitals insurers.
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of referral and in-patient care), were engaged in the business of insurance and were, accordingly, subject to regulation as insurers.148 Similarly, a recent General Counsel Memorandum explained that an HMO
would be considered to be engaged in the business of insurance, for
purposes of section 501(m) of the Internal Revenue Code, where it
did not provide the health care services itself but, rather, contracted
with providers on an indemnity basis. This arrangement meant that
the HMO incurred an insurance risk "in that [its] expenses were not
limited to the physicians' salaries, to the cost of operating health
facilities, or to the actual amount of the premium collected. [The
HMO] incurred the risk that the charges [that
it] had contracted to
149
pay might exceed the premiums collected.'
Consequently, it is possible to characterize both arrangements
under which providers take risk for their own services, and arrangements under which providers take risk for the services of others, as
insurance. With regard to the first type of arrangement, there are both
precedents that support, 50 and precedents that detract from, such a
characterization.'
However, for the purposes of this analysis, the
point will not be belabored. To the extent that MCPs are qualified as
HMOs or nonprofit health service plans, generally the state statutes
explicitly contemplate that providers will take risk for the cost of
their own services.'52 Even if these arrangements exist in the absence of such legislation, the harm that can follow from these types
of relationships is minimal. The risk to which the physician is exposed is limited153 and, therefore, this exposure is unlikely to unduly sway his or her judgment. In contrast, where a physician is at risk
for the services of others, she will lose money every time she authorizes a referral service. Accordingly, the focus of concern should be
on relationships in which the physician agrees to take risk for the
services of others.

148. 90-030 Op. Md. Att'y Gen. 1 (1990); see also 82-71 Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 144
(1982); 84-299 Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 4 (1984); 83-118 Op. Tenn. Att'y Gen. 3 (1983).
149. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Sept. 30, 1987) (citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,734
(May 19, 1976)).
150. See, e.g., National Consol. Indus., Ltd. v. Department of Ins., 392 N.E.2d 295 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979); 82-71 Op. Ga. Att'y Gen. 144 (1982).
151. See, e.g., Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,829 (August 24, 1990) and cases cited therein.
152. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62D.05, subd. 3 (1990).
153. See supra discussion accompanying notes 138-41.
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B. The Risks Obviated by the Regulation of the Business of Insurance
Insurance licensing statutes typically cover three primary areas:
provisions intended to assure the financial strength of the company;154 provisions intended to assure fair benefit determinations;"'5
and mandatory benefit provisions."' In other words, the primary
purpose of the licensing statutes is to assure that the insurer provides
the benefits that it has promised to provide and that it has the fimancial ability to provide these benefits.'57
Risk-sharing capitation relationships implicate the same concerns
as traditional insurance relationships. Like traditional insurers, providers can minimize their costs by denying legitimate claims. However,
unlike traditional insurers, providers are capable of controlling whether many of the claims are generated; by denying access to care for
which the provider is at risk, the cost is avoided.' 58 The physician
acts as a check on the traditional insurer because he will at least alert
the patient to the fact that the care is indicated. However, if the physician does not recommend the care, the patient will never know that
the care might be indicated.'59 Since traditional indemnity insurers
typically make coverage decisions after the fact, the physician, not the
insurance company, determines what care will be received. The greatest harm that can follow from the failure of an insurer to provide
coverage is purely economic, while the harm that can result from the
decision of a physician to forego treatment can be much more significant.16

154. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62A.02 (1990).
155. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62A.04 (1990).
156. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62A.01 (1990).
157. See California Physicians' Serv. v. Garrison, 172 P.2d 4, 17 (Cal. 1946) (explaining
that "[t]he extensive insurance regulations primarily are designed to protect the insured, or the
public, from the insurer.").
158. A recent government study found that the use by the Medicaid program of fixed
payments to HMOs encourages HMOs to restrict care rendered to Medicaid recipients. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID: OVERSIGHT OF HEALTH MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATIONS
IN THE CHICAGO AREA 2 (1990 Report to Rep. Cardiss Collins) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
159. Perhaps in recognition of this problem, the federal HMO law requires that if an
HMO provides services through a "medical group," that group must "establish an arrangement
whereby a member's enrollment status is not known to the health professional who provides
health services to the member." 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(4)(C)(v) (1988).
160. "A mistaken conclusion about medical necessity following retrospective review will
result in the wrongful withholding of payment. An erroneous decision in a prospective review
process, on the other hand, in practical consequences, results in the withholding of necessary
care, potentially leading to a patient's permanent disability or death." Wickline v. State, 239

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol20/iss1/2

40

Sanders: Regulating Managed Care Plans Under Current Law: A Radical Revers
1991]

REGULA77NG MANAGED CARE PLANS

Licensed insurers are generally subject to rigorous regulation
designed to ensure their financial ability to honor claims. These regulations usually involve, among other things, the maintenance of significant reserves. 6 It has been suggested that the primary public policy served by the reserve requirements is to ensure that the subscribers
do not fear the risk of personal liability for the cost of medical services. 62 This particular risk is obviated, in the case of HMOs, by
state HMO acts that specifically compel affiliated providers to waive
any right that they might have to secure payment from patients, and
to continue, for a specified period of time, to provide care in the
event that the HMO defaults. 63 However, because of the ability-even the tendency-of some MCPs to dominate the practice of
affiliated providers, the financial collapse of an MCP might result in
the disruption of care."6 These providers are not required to, and in
fact rarely do, maintain reserves, and their continuing care obligations
in the face of the MCP's collapse can cause immediate financial ruin.
It is difficult to believe that patients will not be adversely affected. If
an insurance company fails, some claims will not be paid, but in
most instances patient care should not be disrupted. Providers are
unlikely to be dependent on a single insurer for a large portion of
their practice, while they are often wedded to an MCP.
Those risk-shifting arrangements that require the provider to
reimburse the MCP could jeopardize the financial health of large
networks of providers. These arrangements generally provide that a
portion of the "premium" revenue be set aside for funding referral
and specialty care. The provider becomes liable for out-of-pocket
payments to the MCP only after the set-aside has been expended. If
premiums are set too low (which is a very real possibility in a competitive market), many of the providers will, despite their best efforts
at cost containment, become liable to the MCP. Since the potential
liability is so onerous, these providers might become insolvent.
Wholly apart from any concern for the well-being of the provid-

Cal. Rptr. 810, 812 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). See supra text accompanying notes 54-81.
161. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 60A.07, subd. 5a (1990).
162. People ex reL Roddis v. California Mut. Ass'n, 441 P.2d 97, 100 (Cal. 1968).
163. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 62D.121 (1990).
164. The GAO raised these same concerns with regard to capitated HMOs when it
recently recommended that HMOs participating in the. Medicaid program be required to prove
financial solvency, develop a plan for coping with insolvency, or enroll a specific percentage
on non-Medicare/Medicaid patients in order to ensure an adequate base for spreading risk. See
GAO REPORT, supra note 158.
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ers, this prospect is alarming. Financial instability could lead to the
disruption of the health care delivery system. Many physicians would
likely terminate their relationship with affected clinics, and affected
clinics would be unlikely to renew their relationships with the MCP.
A significant exodus of physicians from an MCP's network could
jeopardize the health of the MCP in two ways. The MCP might find
itself without sufficient physicians to serve its patients and, if the
providers are unable to make good on their financial obligations to
the MCP, the MCP might also find itself facing insolvency.
C. Do HMO Statutes Exempt MCP Risk-Sharing Arrangements
from Regulation Under the Insurance Statutes?
Most of these risk-sharing arrangements are operated by HMOs.
MCPs that qualify as HMOs under either federal 165 or state law are
typically exempt from regulation as insurance companies,"6 even
though the risk assumed by the HMOs is not readily distinguishable
from the risk assumed by insurers. It is doubtful that the exemption
can also be construed to exempt affiliated providers from regulation.
The federal statute specifically authorizes federally qualified HMOs to
obtain insurance or to make other arrangements for passing off certain
specified risks. With regard to providers, the statute specifically authorizes the HMO to "make arrangements with physicians or other
health professionals, [or] health care institutions . . .to assume all or
part of the financial risk on a prospective basis for the provision of
basic health services by physicians or other professionals or through
the institutions.' 67 It is unclear whether this provision should be
interpreted to permit the HMO to contract with one type of provider
(a physician, for example) to take risk for the provision of health care
services by the other types of providers, or whether the statute contemplates that the HMO may contract with a physician only to take
financial risk for his own services. In any event, this statutory provision only describes the type of entity that is eligible for federal qualification. The statute has absolutely no bearing on HMOs that are not
federally qualified, and many are not. Even if the HMO is federally
qualified, the limits of the HMO's authority to contract to pass off
risk to providers, and the restrictions on the legality of providers

165. 42 U.S.C. § 300e-1(2) (1989).
166. An HMO qualifying as a federal HMO is exempt under state insurance statutes with
respect to initial capitalization and reserve requirements. Id. § 300e-10(a)(1)(D) (1989).
167. Id. § 300e(c)(2) (1991).
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taking risk, are matters of state law. 6 '
Most state statutes explicitly contemplate that some risk will be
assumed by the provider. Some statutes, such as New York's, could
be read to contemplate that providers will assume risk not only for
the provision of their own services, but also for the cost of services
provided by third parties. New York's statute provides, in pertinent
part, that the HMO may "require providers to share financial risk
under the terms of their agreements." 169 Some other state laws do
not clearly contemplate such an arrangement. For example,
Minnesota's HMO statute provides that HMOs may "[c]ontract with
providers of health care services to render the services the health
maintenance organization has promised to provide ... [and] contract
. . . for insurance, indemnity or reimbursewith insurance companies
70
cost."
its
of
ment
Absent a specific statement that physicians may take risk for the
cost of services provided by others, public policy and traditional rules
of statutory construction favor a strict construction of the state HMO
statutes. As discussed above, the interests of the public are jeopardized by these types of risk relationships.17 ' Moreover, no state statute that I have found explicitly exempts the physician (rather than the
HMO) from regulation under the insurance laws. Thus, even HMO
laws that specifically acknowledge that risk can be assumed by a
physician can be made entirely consistent with the insurance laws
only by finding that physicians who participate in such relationships
must first obtain a license to engage in the business of insurance.
D. The Impact of the Elimination of Risk-Sharing Relationships.
The practical result of the application of the insurance laws to
physicians 72 is that, with the possible exception of large

168. But see id. § 300e-10(a)(1)(E) (1989) (exempting federally qualified HMOs from
state regulations that impose requirements that "prohibit the entity from complying with the
requirements of this subchapter."). It is not clear that state law requirements that prohibit
providers from taking financial risk for the services of others would be construed as violative
of subsection (1)(E) inasmuch as the federal law arguably permits, but certainly does not
require, that IMOs enter into such relationships.
169. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4402(c) (McKinney 1985).
170. MINN. STAT. § 62D.05, subd: 3 (1990).
171. See supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text.
172. A recent example of a law that specifically addresses the question of whether
providers may engage in risk-sharing arrangements is MNtN. STAT. § 62D.12, subd. 9b
(1990), which prohibits hospitals from assuming risk for services provided by "facilities or
providers not owned, operated, or otherwise subject to the control of the hospital assuming
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multi-specialty clinics, they will no longer participate in those
risk-sharing arrangements that put them at risk for the cost of the
services of others. Thus, a powerful incentive for cost containment
will no longer be available to MCPs.' 73 MCPs will still, however,
have available to them a panoply of financial incentives"7 a and
structural methods for encouraging cost containment. 7 5
CONCLUSION

It has not been the aim of this Article to suggest that MCPs
should be abolished, as they undoubtedly serve a legitimate competitive function. Rather, it has been to point out that accepted MCP
practice is moving further from legal and ethical norms governing the
practice of medicine. It seems unlikely that the beneficial effects of
MCPs are so great as to justify the complete disregard of these
norms. The suggestions set forth in this Article would go a long way
toward forcing MCPs to operate in an acceptable manner without, I
believe, significantly impairing their ability to recognize efficiencies.
Perhaps this Article will initiate a discussion regarding the appropriate
regulation of MCPs. There is simply too much at stake to continue to
ignore the control that MCPs exercise over the delivery of health
care, not to mention the influence that they exert on physicians in the
exercise of their professional judgment and the fulfillment of their
moral and ethical obligations.

the financial risk."
173. Another consequence might be that many MCPs will find it difficult to avoid
taxation under I.R.C. section 501(m). See, e.g., supra note 149.
174. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 30-40 for a description of the financial

incentives.
175. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 25-29 and 36-39 for a description of the
structural methods.
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